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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, under the Federal Employers Liability Act
(“FELA”), a defendant whose negligence has been found to be an
actual and proximate cause of a single, indivisible injury to the
plaintiff should be liable for only a portion of the injury to which
it contributed.
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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae, the undersigned professors of law at American
law schools (See Appendix for biographical information of each
amicus curiae), have a strong interest in this case for two reasons.
First, amici, all of whom teach, research, and write about tort
law, have a strong interest in the proper development,
exposition, and application of just principles of tort liability in all
its various manifestations, including the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA). This Court’s pronouncements on major
principles of tort liability, such as the principles at issue in this
case governing the proper allocation of liability among the
multiple responsible causes of an injury, will have great
influence not only on actions under FELA, but also on actions
under tort law in general, federal admiralty law, environmental
law, and many other areas of law.
Second, amici, as both teachers of law and lawyers, have a
strong interest in the accurate exposition of legal cases, history,
and principles in legal education and legal practice. We believe
the petitioner’s brief seriously misstates the past and present
state of the law regarding the allocation of liability among the
multiple responsible causes of an injury.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The petitioner asserts that the traditional common law used
fractional apportionment of liability (proportionate several
liability), rather than joint and several liability or full several
(separate) liability, for all cases other than those involving
tortfeasors acting in concert; that this was the state of the law at
the time that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45
U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq., was enacted in 1908; that FELA incorporates
the common law’s supposed preference for proportionate several
liability; that joint and several liability for independent
tortfeasors existed only for a brief period during the middle of
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the twentieth century; and that the evolving common law, the
Restatements, and just principles of liability support
proportionate several liability.
All of these assertions are clearly incorrect.
Petitioner’s description of the common law at the time of
FELA’s enactment misunderstands and confuses the distinct
rules and doctrines governing procedural joinder and
substantive liability. Under both the common law and federal
admiralty law at the time of FELA’s enactment, and long before,
each defendant who tortiously contributed to a plaintiff’s injury
was fully liable for that injury, regardless of whether other
tortious causes of the plaintiff’s injury could be joined in the
same lawsuit. See Part A infra.
Joint and several liability was intended and has been
consistently employed by federal and state courts under FELA
from the time of FELA’s enactment. See Part B infra.
Under joint and several liability, a defendant generally is only
liable for injuries for which it is fully responsible as a tortious,
actual, and proximate cause. See Part C infra.
Under the evolving common law, joint and several liability
continues to be overwhelmingly recognized as the fairest method
of allocating liability among multiple responsible causes of an
injury. See part D infra.
There is no basis for this Court to undertake the major step of
discarding and overruling its own precedents and the universal
understanding and practice of the federal and state courts over
the last almost 100 years, which have uniformly held that joint
and several liability is an integral part of FELA’s comparativeresponsibility liability regime, furthers FELA’s broad remedial
purposes, and is consistent with over 100 years of similar
understanding and practice in both the common law and federal
admiralty law.
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ARGUMENT
A. UNDER THE COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL
ADMIRALTY LAW AT THE TIME OF FELA’S
ENACTMENT, AND LONG BEFORE, EACH
DEFENDANT WHO TORTIOUSLY CONTRIBUTED
TO A PLAINTIFF’S INJURY WAS FULLY LIABLE FOR
THAT INJURY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OTHER
TORTIOUS CAUSES OF THE PLAINTIFF’S INJURY
COULD BE JOINED IN THE SAME LAWSUIT
The petitioner asserts that, under the common law at the time
of FELA’s enactment in 1908, apportionment of fractional
liability among the multiple tortious causes of a plaintiff’s injury
was the “dominant,” “general,” “overwhelming” rule, and that
defendants were held fully liable for an injury to which they
contributed only if they acted in concert or with unity of
purpose. Petitioner’s Brief at 12-13, 32 & n.26, 34-36, 39-40, 49.
This assertion is clearly incorrect. It is based on a confusion and
misunderstanding regarding the traditional use of the terms
“joint” and “several” to describe the distinct procedural and
substantive aspects of liability – a confusion and misunderstanding that is warned against in the very sources that are cited
by petitioner. See, e.g., W. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 25 Cal. L. Rev. 413, 413 (1937) (“the separate problems
of joinder of parties in the same action, as a matter of procedure,
and the substantive liability of two or more parties for the same
result, require separate consideration, and have very little in
common”).
The terms “joint tort,” “joint liability,” and “joint tortfeasors”
initially were primarily procedural terms that were applied to
situations in which defendants could be joined in the same
lawsuit, which under the traditional common law was allowed
only in situations involving concerted action, in which each
tortfeasor could be held liable for the consequences of each

4
other’s acts as well as their own acts, or vicarious liability. Id. at
413-15, 430; J. Fleming, The Law of Torts 255 (8th ed. 1992).
Independently acting tortfeasors who tortiously contributed
to the same injury, who in England are still called “concurrent
tortfeasors” rather than “joint tortfeasors,” could not be joined in
the same action, yet each was “severally” (separately) liable for
the entire injury. Fleming at 257-58; Prosser at 414-15, 418-19,
424, 439. As the Restatement Third notes, “before the advent of
comparative responsibility, ‘several liability’ was employed to
describe a defendant who was responsible for all of the plaintiff’s
damages but who could not be joined in a suit with any other
defendant who may also have been responsible,” as well as other
situations in which different defendants caused separate injuries
to the same plaintiff and were held “severally” (fully) liable “for
the portion of the plaintiff’s injury caused by that defendant.”
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 11 cmt. a,
reporters’ note at 109-110 (2000) (citation omitted) [Restatement
Third].1
Procedural joinder of independently acting tortfeasors is now
allowed, indeed encouraged, and it therefore is customary in the
United States to refer to such independently acting tortfeasors,
as well as tortfeasors acting in concert, as “joint tortfeasors.” But,
contrary to the assertions of petitioner, this procedural change
did not result in any change in substantive liability.

1

The petitioner’s failure to distinguish the procedural joinder issue
from the substantive liability issue is exemplified by its discussion of
McGannon v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 199 N.W. 894 (Minn. 1924), in which
the court merely held, following the restrictive procedural joinder rules
then in effect, that the plaintiff’s joinder as defendants in the same
action of two successive employers who exposed the plaintiff to
airborne sand and fumes at the same job site was improper because the
employers had not acted in concert and their independent acts, which
the court assumed resulted in two distinct injuries, ”were not
concurrent either in point of time or in result.” Id. at 184, 185 (emphasis
added).
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Both before and after this procedural change, each tortfeasor,
whether acting in concert or independently, was fully liable for
the entirety of any injury that was caused by its tortious conduct,
regardless of whether other tortfeasors or natural events also
contributed to the same injury. (However, a plaintiff’s total
aggregate recovery from all the contributing tortfeasors can
never exceed the amount of his actual damages.) See, e.g., Miller
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 290 U.S. 227, 236 (1933) (“The rule is
settled by innumerable authorities that if injury be caused by the
concurring negligence of the defendant and a third person, the
defendant is liable to the same extent as though it had been
caused by his negligence alone.”) (citing a number of U.S.
Supreme Court and federal Circuit Court cases from the 19th and
early 20th centuries); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hoffman, 208 F. 221,
227 (9th Cir. 1913) (“[I]f concurring or successive acts of
negligence of numerous persons combined together caused the
plaintiff’s injury, he may recover damages of either or both, and
neither can interpose the defense that the prior or concurrent
negligence of the other contributed to the injury.”); Restatement
Third § 10 cmt. b, reporters’ note at 104; C. Baker, Tort 142-43 (4th
ed. 1986); 3 F. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 10.1 at 1, 3-5, 7-10
(2d ed. 1986) [Harper, James & Gray]; W.P. Keeton et al., Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Tort § 46 at 322, § 47 at 324-29 (5th ed.
1984) [Prosser & Keeton].
Moreover, as the Restatement Third states, “Many courts, even
before the 20th century, [allowed procedural joinder and thus]
imposed joint and several liability on independent tortfeasors
when their acts caused truly indivisible harm.” Restatement Third
§ A18 cmt. a, reporters’ note at 163 (citing Prosser, 25 Cal. L.
Rev. at 418-19 & nn.35-38; Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability,
17 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 406 n.28, 408 n.35 (1939)). It traces such joint
and several liability for independent tortfeasors at least as far
back as l771. Id.
At the time that FELA was enacted, joint and several liability
for independent tortfeasors had already been firmly established
in federal admiralty law, as part of a comparative-responsibility
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regime that was in place long before the adoption of such
regimes by the States:
[T]he general maritime law has long recognized the
concept of joint liability. For example, in The Atlas, 93
U.S. 302 (1876), the Supreme Court held that the insurer
of cargo lost in a collision between two vessels caused by
the fault of both could recover all of its damages from one
vessel. The Court borrowed this rule from the common
law, which recognized a plaintiff’s right “to sue . . . all the
wrong-doers, or any one of them, at his election; and it is
equally clear, that, if he did not contribute to the disaster,
he is entitled to judgment in either case for the full
amount of his loss.” Id., at 315; see also The Alabama, 92
U.S. 695 (1876); The George Washington, 76 U.S. 513 (1870);
The Juniata, 93 U.S. 337, (1876); The Sterling, 106 U.S. 647
(1882) (describing the joint liability rule in admiralty as
“well-established”).
Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 882 F.2d 1421, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988)
(parallel citations omitted).
The common-law rule barring any recovery by a
contributorily negligent plaintiff was replaced by a rule of per
capita divided damages for vessel collision cases in The Schooner
Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855), and
disagreement over its application outside the collision context
was resolved in The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890), which
definitively replaced the prior rule with a rule of comparative
responsibility. As the Simeon court observed, “Neither the
Supreme Court nor the lower courts have ever retreated from the
rule of joint liability under maritime law.” Simeon, 852 F.2d at
1428 (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443
U.S. 256, 260 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2756 n. 7 (1979); Cooper
Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 2178
(1974); Seal Offshore, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 777 F.2d 1042
(5th Cir.1985); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Auto Transportation, S.A.,
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763 F.2d 745, 756 (5th Cir.1985); Central Rivers Towing, Inc. v. City
of Beardstown, Ill., 750 F.2d 565, 575 (7th Cir.1984).)2
During the recent era of “tort reform,” the term “several
liability” has come to mean fractional or partial liability, rather
than full liability, for the harm to which one contributed. As the
Restatement Third notes, this use of the term “several liability” is
“imprecise and potentially confusing” and historically
inaccurate, for the reasons discussed above. Id. § 11 cmt. a,
reporters’ note at 109-110. However, deferring to the now
prevalent usage, the Restatement Third uses the term “several
liability” in its current sense of fractional or partial rather than
full liability. Id. A more precise and less confusing term for such
fractional or partial liability, which will henceforth be used in
this brief, is “proportionate several liability.” See Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1084-89 (Ill. 1997); R. Wright,
Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: Joint and
Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 22 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1141, 1142, 1165-68 (1985) [Wright, Allocating Liability].
B. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY HAS BEEN
CONSISTENTLY EMPLOYED UNDER FELA FROM
THE TIME OF FELA’S ENACTMENT
The petitioner asserts that Congress intended to incorporate
proportionate several liability rather than joint and several
liability as part of FELA’s comparative-responsibility liability
regime. Petitioner’s Brief at 31-33 & n.26. This also is clearly

2

The Petitioner’s Brief, at 43 n.38 & 46 n.43, implies that this Court
adopted proportionate several liability in admiralty law in United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). However, Reliable
Transfer merely replaced the antiquated rule of per capita divided
damages in the collision context with a rule of comparative
responsibility. See id. at 397-99, 410-11. The Court explicitly stated that
its holding “would simply bring recovery for property damage in
maritime collision cases into line with the rule of admiralty law long
since established . . . for personal injury cases.” Id. at 409.
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incorrect. The petitioner bases its argument almost entirely on
an assumption that proportionate several liability, rather than
joint-and-several or full-several liability, was the general rule at
the time that FELA was enacted – an assumption that, as was
discussed in Part A supra, is completely false with respect to both
the common law and the comparable federal admiralty law.
As this Court emphasized in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.,
352 U.S. 500 (1957), FELA “expressly imposes liability upon the
employer to pay damages for injury or death due ‘in whole or in
part’ to its negligence.” Id. at 507 (emphasis in original) (citing 35
Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. § 51). The Court properly rejected the
Missouri court’s insistence on “but for” causation as an unduly
restrictive concept of causation: “Under [FELA] the test . . . is
simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that
the employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in
producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.”
Id. at 506.
The petitioner asserts that, under Rogers, defendants are
subjected to a “reduced causation standard” that holds them
liable for damage they did not cause and that is different and
significantly lower than the causation standard that is applied in
their contribution claims against others who contributed to the
same injury. Petitioner’s Brief at 46-48. This also is not correct.
Petitioner admits that a plaintiff in a FELA action must prove
that the defendant’s tortious conduct contributed to his injury.
Id. at 48 & n.45. Petitioner cites Prosser’s discussion of the
“substantial factor” formula to support its claim that “[c]ausation
requirements are often relaxed in toxic exposure cases to permit
plaintiffs to recover more readily.” Id. at 46 n.42 (citing Prosser
& Keeton at 267-68). However, the “substantial factor” formula
is routinely invoked by courts inside and outside of tort law,
along with simple “contribution” tests, to avoid incorrect
findings of no causal contribution under the but-for test when
there are multiple sufficient causes of an injury. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 431 & 432 (1965); Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles) § 27 & cmts. a, b, f, g
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(Tentative Draft No. 2, March 25, 2002) [Restatement Third: Basic
Principles]; R. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty,
Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 Vand.
L. Rev. 1071, 1075-80, 1097-1109 (2001) [Wright, Legal
Responsibility].
The courts have uniformly interpreted FELA, consistent with
the common law and federal admiralty law at the date of its
enactment and thereafter, as imposing full liability on the
employer (after reduction for any contributory negligence by the
plaintiff) for any injury that was contributed to by the
employer’s negligence, despite other contributing causes. For
example, in Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119 F.2d 715 (9th Cir.
1941), in which a railroad motorman was killed in a collision
between a truck and the train on which he was working, the
court held that, although the two defendants were not “joint
tortfeasors,” since they were not acting in concert, they were
each (including the railroad under FELA) fully liable for the
plaintiff’s injury: “Where the independent tortious acts of two
persons combine to produce an injury indivisible in its nature,
either tortfeasor may be held liable for the entire damage – not
because he is responsible for the act of the other, but because his
own act is regarded in law as a cause of the injury.” Id. at 716
(citations omitted).
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 F. Supp. 820, 824-25
(S.D. Cal. 1937) (various parties responsible for the death of a
railroad conductor as a result of his being assaulted by a
passenger on the train, including the railroad under FELA, held
jointly and severally liable for entire damages), rev’d on other
grounds, Jenkins v. Pullman Co., 96 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1938), aff’d,
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1938); Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Allen, 65 So. 8, 12 (Fla. 1914) (railroad employer liable under
FELA and third party liable under state law each jointly and
severally liable for railroad employee’s entire injury); Riley v.
Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co., 156 N.W. 272, 273 (Minn. 1916) (same);
Lindsay v. Acme Cement Plaster Co., 190 N.W. 275, 278 (Mich. 1922)
(same); Demopolis Tel. Co. v. Hood, 102 So. 35, 37 (Ala. 1924)
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(railroad employer liable under FELA and third party liable
under state law each severally liable for railroad employee’s
entire injury); Southern Ry. Co. v. Blanton, 10 S.E.2d 430, 436-37
(Ga. App. 1940) (railroad employer liable under FELA and third
party liable under state law each proximate cause of and liable
for railroad employee’s entire injury); Gaulden v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 654 P.2d 383, 389-91 (Ks. 1982) (despite adoption
of proportionate several liability for state tort law claims and lack
of provision for contribution or indemnity action against third
party tortfeasor in FELA, railroad employer is fully liable under
FELA for injury to employee resulting from collision with truck
at railroad crossing, and railroad can maintain contribution or
indemnity action against the truck driver); Narcise v. Illinois C. G.
R. Co., 427 So. 2d 1192, 1195-96 (La. 1983) (certified question from
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit) (solidary [joint and
several] liability exists between defendant railroad liable under
FELA and third party liable under state tort law, and defendant
railroad can maintain contribution or indemnity action against
third-party tortfeasor); Bean v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 525 N.E.2d
1231, 1234 (Ill. App. 1988) (railroad defendant under FELA and
third-party tortfeasor under state tort law are joint tortfeasors
who can maintain contribution claims against one another);
Gilbert v. CSX Transp., Inc., 397 S.E.2d 447, 450 (Ga. App. 1990)
(same); Lewis v. Nat’l R. Passenger Corp., 675 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505-06
(Civil Ct. NYC 1998) (state proportionate-several-liability statute
cannot be used in FELA action to limit the defendant railroad’s
full liability); Annotation, Right of Railroad, Charged with Liability
for Injury to or Death of Employee under Federal Employers Liability
Act, to Claim Indemnity or Contribution from Other Tortfeasor, 19
A.L.R.3d 928, 931 (1968).
C. UNDER JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, A
DEFENDANT GENERALLY IS ONLY LIABLE FOR
INJURIES FOR WHICH IT IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE
AS A TORTIOUS, ACTUAL, AND PROXIMATE
CAUSE
The petitioner asserts that, in any case in which there are
multiple contributing causes of a plaintiff’s injury, including
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even innocent human and natural causes (which will always
exist), holding the defendant fully liable for the injury to which
it contributed (under the doctrine of joint and several liability or
otherwise) results in the defendant being held liable for more
damages than she tortiously caused or for which she was
responsible. See Petitioner’s Brief at 1-2, 31-33 & n.26, 40 & n.35,
43 n.38, 46-47. As the courts have almost universally noted in
upholding the doctrine of joint and several liability after the
adoption of comparative responsibility, this assertion is false.
For example, in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057
(Ill. 1997), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
We note that the proposition which defendants offer
as the primary explanation for abolishing the doctrine of
joint and several liability, i.e., the assertion that the
doctrine requires tortfeasors to pay for more damages
than they caused, is at odds with this court’s explanation
of joint and several liability in [Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 454
N.E.2d 197 (1983)] . . . [T]he Coney court stated:
“The feasibility of apportioning fault on a
comparative basis does not render an indivisible
injury ‘divisible’ for purposes of the joint and
several liability rule. A concurrent tortfeasor is liable
for the whole of an indivisible injury when his
negligence is a proximate cause of that damage. ***
The mere fact that it may be possible to assign
some percentage figure to the relative culpability
of one negligent defendant as compared to
another does not in any way suggest that each
defendant’s negligence is not a proximate cause of the
entire indivisible injury.” (Emphasis added.)
The principle that tortfeasors who are held jointly and
severally liable are each fully responsible for the entirety
of the plaintiff’s injury has been explained:
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“Joint and several liability only applies to injuries
for which the defendant herself is fully
responsible. She is responsible for the entirety of
some injury only if her tortious behavior was an actual
and proximate cause of the entire injury. [Emphasis
added.] She is not liable for injuries, including
separable portions of injuries, to which she did not
contribute. She is not liable unless the tortious
aspect of her conduct was an actual cause of the
injury. Moreover, even then, she is not liable if,
for reasons of policy or principle, her connection
to the injury is considered too remote or minimal
to be ‘proximate.’“
Id. at 1086 (citations omitted).
As the Best court noted, id. at 1087, there is a fundamental
difference between each tortfeasor’s individual full responsibility
for an injury that it tortiously caused and the comparative
responsibility percentages that are obtained by comparing the
tortfeasors’ individual full responsibilities for the injury. For
example, if two defendants were each negligent, actual, and
proximate causes of a plaintiff’s injury, neither is merely “50%
negligent,” a cause of only 50% of the injury, or only “50%
responsible.” Such statements make as much sense as saying
that someone is 50% pregnant or caused 50% of a death or a
broken leg. Rather, each defendant was 100% negligent, and
each defendant’s negligence was an actual and proximate cause
of 100% of the injury. Each defendant therefore is fully
responsible for the entire injury. Only when we compare their
individual full responsibilities, and assume that they were
equally negligent, does it make sense to say that each defendant,
when compared to the other, bears 50% of the total comparative
responsibility for the injury.
Like the Best court, the vast majority of State courts have held
that a defendant’s individual full responsibility for an injury that
was an actual and proximate result of her tortious behavior is not
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diminished if some other person’s tortious behavior also was an
actual and proximate cause of the injury. See part D infra.
Rather, as the courts have held, such concurrent contribution to
an injury by multiple tortfeasors provides a basis for claims
among the tortfeasors themselves, in the form of contribution or
indemnity actions, for an equitable sharing of their joint and
several liability to the plaintiff based on their comparative
responsibility.
A tortfeasor’s individual full responsibility for an injury is
most obvious when its tortious behavior was either necessary or
independently sufficient for the occurrence of the injury. See
Prosser at 432-34. Yet, under the petitioner’s proportionateseveral-liability approach, each of 100 defendants would only be
liable for one percent of an injury even if each was an
independently sufficient cause of the injury – for example, if each
of 100 defendants (intentionally or negligently) independently
fired a fatal bullet into the plaintiff’s brain or negligently put
sufficient poison in the plaintiff’s coffee to cause death.3

3

A draft of the Restatement Third: Basic Principles would treat “trivial
and insubstantial contributions” to an injury as an actual cause of the
injury, but not as a proximate cause unless the trivial or insubstantial
contribution was a necessary (“but for”) cause of the injury: “the actor
who tortiously provides the straw that breaks the camel’s back is
subject to liability for the broken back.” Restatement Third: Basic
Principles § 29 cmt. q. Presumably, a tortious contribution that is
independently sufficient for an injury is neither trivial nor insubstantial,
regardless of how de minimus it might be in relation to the aggregate
contributing causes. Similarly, a tortious contribution should not be
deemed trivial or insignificant, even if it is neither necessary nor
independently sufficient and is de minimus in relation to the aggregate
causal contributions, if it is not de minimus in relation to the other
contributions individually. The draft Restatement’s illustrations refer
to contributions that are trivial and insignificant in comparison to the
other distinct contributions to the injury, rather than in comparison to
all the causal contributions in the aggregate.
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The full-responsibility argument may seem less intuitively
obvious when, as in some pollution and toxic exposure cases,
the defendant’s tortious conduct clearly contributed to an
indivisible injury, but it was neither necessary nor independently
sufficient to cause the injury. For example, assume that three
drops of poison are necessary for a coffee drinker’s death, and
that four tortfeasors, acting independently of one another, each
negligently put one drop of poison in the coffee cup.
It clearly would not be correct to assert that each defendant
was only “25% negligent” or caused only one-fourth of the coffee
drinker’s death. Rather, each defendant was 100% negligent,
and each defendant’s negligence was an actual cause of the
coffee drinker’s indivisible death and all the consequent
damages. See Restatement Third: Basic Principles § 27 & cmts. a, f,
g; Wright, Legal Responsibility, at 1100-01, 1106-08.
If there had been only three defendants, each of them clearly
would have been individually fully responsible as a necessary
(“but for”) cause of the injury. It is not clear why this individual
full responsibility should be reduced to responsibility for only
one-fourth of the injury merely because a duplicative drop of
poison was added by a fourth defendant. Such a result would
potentially subject plaintiffs to a perverse “tortfest,” in which the
more tortfeasors there were, the less liable each would be,
although the tortious behavior of each defendant remained
constant and was an actual cause of the plaintiff’s entire injury.
Thus, when there are multiple tortious contributions to a
single, indivisible injury, none of which by itself was either
necessary or independently sufficient for the occurrence of the
injury, many courts have held the tortious contributing causes
jointly and severally liable. Other courts have treated the injury
as being theoretically divisible into separately caused portions,
even when it clearly was not, to justify a shift to what amounted
to proportionate several liability. See 3 Harper, James & Gray §
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10.1 at 25-29; 4 id. § 20.3 at 120-21, 125-26 & nn.28-30; Prosser &
Keeton § 52 at 345-46, 349, 351, 354-55.4
The Restatement Second uncomfortably reflects this division of
authority. It would allow defendants in such situations to be
liable for only a portion of the resulting damages if there was a
reasonable basis for apportionment or division according to the
relative contribution of each defendant. See Restatement Second
§§ 433A & 881. However, its illustrations inconsistently treat
very similar situations as being or not being “divisible” or
“apportionable.”5
4

It has been suggested that the reluctance of the second group of courts
to impose joint and several liability was due to the former rule that did
not allow a tortfeasor who initially paid for the injury to obtain
contribution from the other tortfeasors. Prosser & Keeton § 52 at 349.
This reluctance should be substantially diminished when, as is true in
almost all jurisdictions today, contribution is permitted based on the
tortfeasors’ comparative responsibility. Indeed, as is discussed further
in Part D infra, two of the most frequent exceptions in the statutes
eliminating, limiting, or modifying joint and several liability have been
the exceptions that retain joint and several liability in situations
involving environmental pollution or toxic substances.

5

For example, in Restatement Second § 433A illustration 5, two
defendants each negligently discharge oil into a stream, making the
water unusable for industrial purposes by a lower riparian property
owner. The injury to the plaintiff is treated as being divisible or
apportionable, apparently because the respective contributions to the
combined pollution can be measured (70% and 30%, respectively).
Similarly, in Restatement 2d § 881 illustration 2, in which three
defendants operating smelter plants in a farming community “each
send out fumes of equal concentration that unite and denude the grass
of a nearby farmer, each defendant is said to be liable only for “the
proportion of the total harm that his proportion of the fumes bears to
the total amount of fumes.”
However, in illustrations 14 and 15 to § 433A, in which two
defendants similarly each negligently discharge oil into a stream, and
the combined oil in the stream is ignited and the fire spreads to and
burns down plaintiff’s barn (illus. 14) or is drunk by the plaintiff’s
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Some of the pollution or toxic-exposure cases involve
situations in which there are, or may be, theoretically separable
injuries attributable to distinct causes, but it is practically
impossible to distinguish the separable injuries and their distinct
causes. These cases are similar to the multiple collision cases, in
which the first defendant negligently caused the initial collision,
which resulted in some injury to the vehicle or person of the
plaintiff, and a second plaintiff negligently caused the second
collision, causing additional injury to the vehicle or person of the
plaintiff. Assuming the second collision would not have
occurred in the absence of the first collision, the first defendant’s
negligence was a necessary (but for) cause of both the initial and
additional injuries, and she therefore is responsible for all of the
injuries. However, the second defendant’s negligence was only
a cause of the additional injury due to the second collision.
Another group of similar cases is the animal trespass cases,
in which, for example, trespassing cattle belonging to different
defendants consumed the plaintiff’s crops, or dogs belonging to
different defendants killed the plaintiff’s sheep. In these cases,
each defendant’s animal caused theoretically separable injuries
to the plaintiff. Cases involving multiple sources of pollution
sometimes are analogized to the multiple animal cases, but most
of the pollution cases are instead similar to the coffee drinker
hypothetical, in which each drop of poison (pollution)
contributed to the entire injury.

cattle which are thereby poisoned and die (illus. 15), the plaintiff’s
injuries are deemed indivisible and each defendant is fully (jointly and
severally) liable for the entirety of plaintiff’s damages. This is so,
apparently regardless of the ability to measure the defendants’ relative
contributions of oil, because “certain kinds of harm, by their very
nature, are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical
division. . . . [I]t is impossible . . . to say that one man has caused [part]
of it and another the rest.” Id. comment i. This is stated to be true for
all or almost all injuries to persons or tangible property. Id.
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When there are theoretically separable injuries attributable to
distinct causes but it is difficult or impossible to actually
distinguish (even roughly) the injuries or their causes, the
modern approach has been to hold each defendant who
tortiously contributed to (at least some of) the injuries jointly and
severally liable for all the injuries, unless the tortfeasor can prove
that she did not contribute to some separable portion of the
injuries or could only have contributed to a certain maximum
portion. See Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, 495 F.2d 213
(6th Cir. 1974); Maddux v. Donaldson, 108 N.W.2d 33 (Mich.
1961); Restatement Second § 433B(2); Restatement Third § 11 cmt. b
at 109, § C18 cmt. a & reporters’ note; 3 Harper, James & Gray §
10.2, at 26-29; 4 id., § 20.3, at 117-18, 124 n.27, 127-29 & n.32;
Prosser & Keeton § 52, at 345-46, 348-53.
Restatement Third § 26 replaces the Restatement Second’s
ambiguous provisions and conflicting illustrations. See id. cmt.
b. It rejects the petitioner’s position, that damages or injuries
should be treated as divisible based merely on relative causal
contribution or percentages of comparative responsibility, see
Petitioner’s Brief at 40-41 & 49, and instead treats them as being
divisible only if there truly are separable injuries or losses that
can be attributed to different persons based on causation.
Restatement Third § 26 & cmts. a, c, d & h. Damages are divisible
only “when the evidence provides a reasonable basis for the
factfinder to determine: (1) that [a person’s tortious conduct]
“was a legal cause of less than the entire damages for which the
plaintiff seeks recovery and (2) the amount of damages
separately caused by that conduct.” Id. § 26.
The illustrations in the Restatement Third all relate to
successive injury cases where there are theoretically and
practically separable injuries. Although all that is required is a
reasonable basis for division, id. cmt. f, the burden is on the party
alleging divisibility (normally the defendant) to prove the
divisible damages or injuries, based on causation, with sufficient
evidence. “Unless sufficient evidence permits the factfinder to
determine that damages are divisible, they are indivisible.” Id.
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cmt. g. As is discussed in Part D infra, the Restatement Third
would leave the issue of the allocation of liability for indivisible
(inseparable) injuries to the disparate law of the various states.
Id. §§ 17 & 26.
D. UNDER THE EVOLVING COMMON LAW, JOINT
AND SEVERAL LIABILITY CONTINUES TO BE
OVERWHELMINGLY RECOGNIZED AS THE
FAIREST METHOD OF ALLOCATING LIABILITY
AMONG THE MULTIPLE RESPONSIBLE CAUSES OF
AN INJURY
Petitioner asserts that, except for a period during the middle
of the twentieth century, the evolving common law (including
federal law) has retained a supposed preference for fractional
apportionment of liability among the contributing causes of a
plaintiff’s injury. Petitioner’s Brief at 12-13, 32, 39-40, 42-43, 4950. Again, this assertion is clearly incorrect.
Pure joint and several liability is the universal rule in
common-law and civil-law regimes outside the United States,
almost all of which employ comparative-responsibility
principles.6 It also is overwhelmingly preferred by courts in the
United States. As was discussed in Part A supra, this Court has
consistently employed joint and several liability as part of a
comparative-responsibility regime in federal admiralty law since
the 19th century. See Restatement Third § C21 cmt. a, reporters’
note at 214.
All but a handful of State supreme courts have concluded
that joint and several liability should be retained rather than

6

See Fleming at 275-76; A.M. Honoré, Causation and Remoteness of
Damage, in XI International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Torts, Pt. 1,
§§ 7-141, 7-189(2), 7-193 (A. Tunc ed. 1983); C. von Bar, 1 The Common
European Law of Torts 334-38 (1998); A. Weir, Complex Liabilities, in XI
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Torts, Pt. 2, §§ 12-79 to -86,
12-105 to -109, 12-131 to -133 (A. Tunc ed. 1983).
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being replaced by proportionate several liability under a
comparative-responsibility liability regime. See, e.g., Arctic
Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979); Walton v.
Tull, 356 S.W.2d 20, 26 (Ark. 1962); American Motorcycle Ass’n v.
Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978); Tucker v. Union Oil Co. of
California, 603 P.2d 156, 163-69 (Idaho 1979); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus.,
454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983); Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689
N.E.2d 1057, 1084-89 (Ill. 1997); Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845
(Iowa 1983); Maday v. Yellow Taxi Co., 311 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.
1981); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 429 (Tex.
1984); Seattle First Nat’l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d
1308, 1311-14 (Wash. 1978); Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, 289
S.E.2d 679, 684-85 (W. Va. 1982); Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v.
Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 291 N.W.2d 825, 833-35 (Wisc.
1980).
As the Restatement Third states,
The joint and several liability of negligent parties acting
independently who cause a single indivisible injury
gained wide acceptance before the tort-reform legislation
of the mid and late 1980s. This was true whether the
injury was one that was truly indivisible (such as two
vehicles colliding and breaking the plaintiff’s leg) or was
theoretically divisible, but, because of problems of proof,
could not be apportioned based on the causal roles of each
defendant (e.g., maurauding cattle belonging to several
defendants who destroy a field of crops).
Restatement Third § A18 cmt. a, reporters’ note at 163 (citation
omitted); see Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1983)
(“[O]f the thirty-eight other states that have adopted
comparative negligence . . . twenty-nine have completely
retained joint and several liability, five have retained the doctrine
in a [limited or] modified form, and only three have done away
with it (two by statute, one by court decision).”); 3 Harper, James
& Gray § 10.1 at 29-30; 4 id. § 22.17 at 413-16; Prosser & Keeton § 67
at 475; V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 16.4, at 258-61 (2d
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ed. 1986); W. McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several
Liability Because of Comparative Negligence—A Puzzling Choice, 32
Okla. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1979).
The shifts away from pure joint and several liability almost
all occurred as a result of legislative action during the 1980s and
early 1990s, rather than through judicial elaboration of the
common law. See Restatement Third § B18 cmt. a, reporters’ note
at 170-71. The three State courts that replaced joint and several
liability with proportionate several liability in whole or part
mistakenly assumed, like the petitioner, that joint and several
liability results in a defendant’s being held liable for more than
it caused or is responsible for.7
The same erroneous assumption, together with other
erroneous arguments – for example, that joint and several
liability for independently acting tortfeasors was an anomalous
mid-twentieth-century development that was inconsistent with
the earlier common law – motivated the legislative changes in
the joint and several liability doctrine during and following the
liability insurance crisis in the mid-1980s. See Wright, Allocating
Liability, at 1165-68 ; R. Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and
Several Liability, 23 Memphis St. U.L. Rev. 45 (1992); R. Wright,
Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater: A Reply to Professor
Twerski, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1147 (1989).
7

See Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 646 P.2d 579, 582 (N.M.
App. 1982) (assuming the doctrine “hold[s] a person liable for an
amount greater than the extent that person caused injury”), cert. denied,
648 P.2d 784 (N.M. 1982); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okla.
1978) (“By doing away with joint liability plaintiff will collect his
damages from the defendant who is responsible for them.”), limited by
Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980) (noting
criticisms of Laubach by McNichols, supra, and retaining joint and
several liability for innocent plaintiffs); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833
S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992) (assuming that adoption of proportionate
several liability was necessary to ensure that “a particular defendant
will henceforth be liable only for the percentage of a plaintiff’s
damages occasioned by that defendant’s negligence”).
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Yet, contrary to the implication of the petitioner, see
Petitioner’s Brief at 13, 32, 39-40, 42-43, joint and several liability
has been replaced with proportionate several liability (and, even
then, never entirely) in only a few states. The Restatement Third
summarizes: “There currently is no majority rule . . . , although
joint and several liability has been substantially modified in most
jurisdictions both as a result of the adoption of comparative fault
and tort reform during the 1980s and 1990s.” Restatement Third
§ 17 cmt. a at 147.
The following listing of the rules in the various states is based
on the tabulation in the Restatement Third § 17 cmt. a, reporters’
note at 151-59, unless otherwise noted.
• Only sixteen states (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and
Wyoming) have adopted pure proportionate several liability,
subject to various exceptions. For example, Alaska, Idaho,
and Nevada retain joint and several liability for claims
involving hazardous or toxic substances. Arizona preserves
joint and several liability for liability arising under FELA
(Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2506(D)(3) (West Supp. 2001)).
New Mexico preserves joint and several liability for claims
involving products and situations having a sound basis in
public policy.
• Fifteen jurisdictions (Alabama, Arkansas, D.C., Delaware,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Virginia, West Virginia) have retained pure joint and several
liability, with certain limitations in Minnesota and South
Dakota.
• Two states (Missouri, Oregon) have retained joint and several
liability with reallocation of uncollectible shares, which is
equivalent to pure joint and several liability for non-negligent

22
plaintiffs; Oregon retains pure joint and several liability for
claims based on hazardous waste or water or air pollution.
• One state (Connecticut) employs proportionate several
liability but reallocates uncollectible shares; for economic
damages, the reallocation takes place only among the
tortfeasors. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572h (West Supp.
1988).
• Three states (Georgia, Oklahoma, Washington) have retained
joint and several liability unless the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. Washington retains joint and
several liability regardless of the plaintiff’s contributory
negligence for claims involving products, hazardous
materials, or tortious interference with contract.
• Two states (Hawaii, New York) retain joint and several
liability for economic damages and, if the defendant’s
comparative responsibility is equal to or greater than a
certain percentage (25% in Hawaii, 50% in New York), also
for noneconomic damages. However, each state retains pure
joint and several liability for the most prevalent types of
claims: Hawaii for environmental, plane-crash, toxic,
product, asbestos, and motor-vehicle claims; New York for
environmental, product, motor-vehicle, and gross negligence
claims.
• Six states (Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Texas, Wisconsin) retain joint and several liability for
economic and noneconomic damages if the defendant’s
comparative responsibility is more than a certain percentage,
ranging from 25 to 60 percent. Montana and New
Hampshire reallocate uncollectible shares. Illinois (Ill. Comp.
Stat., ch. 735, ¶ 5/2 -1118 (1992)) and New Hampshire retain
pure joint and several liability for environmental pollution
claims. New Jersey and Texas have much lower thresholds
(5% and 15%) for joint and several liability for environmental
claims.
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• One state (Mississippi) retains joint and several liability for
up to 50 percent of the recoverable damages.
• Three states (California, Florida, and Nebraska) retain joint
and several liability for economic damages only, subject to
various thresholds and caps in Florida except for pollution
claims and claims for $25,000 or less.
• Two states (Iowa, Ohio) retain joint and several liability only
for economic damages and only if the defendant’s percentage
of comparative responsibility is greater than or equal to 50
percent. Ohio’s 1996 omnibus “tort reform” statute was
voided in its entirety by the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex
rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062
(1999).
As can be seen from the above listing, a substantial majority
of the states, including many of those adopting pure
proportionate several liability for most situations, retain joint
and several liability for claims involving environmental pollution
and/or toxic substances. Federal and state agencies often stress
the need to retain joint and several liability in such situations.
For example, the Reagan Administration’s Tort Policy Working
Group sought to preserve the government’s ability to hold
polluters jointly and severally liable under federal environmental
statutes, which “are founded upon congressional objectives
which provide that those who contributed to the problem or
profited from the manufacture which created the waste, ought to
bear the cost of cleaning it up. . . . Without some degree of joint
and several liability under [these statutes], the effective
enforcement of these programs could be impeded as a result of
protracted and costly litigation among responsible parties over
the precise allocation of cleanup costs.” U.S. Att’y Gen. Tort
Policy Working Group, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on
the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in
Insurance Availability and Affordability 65 n.7 (Feb. 1986).
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The Restatement Third and all or almost all states also retain
joint and several liability for intentional tortfeasors, tortfeasors
acting in concert, tortfeasors who negligently fail to protect
plaintiffs from intentional injury by another, and tortfeasors who
are vicariously liable for injuries tortiously caused by others.
Restatement Third §§ 12-15.
Otherwise, and again contrary to the petitioner’s implication,
see Petitioner’s Brief at 40-43, 49, the Restatement Third formally
takes no position on the preferred rule, rather deferring to the
disparate rules adopted in each State. See Restatement Third § 17
& cmt. a. However, in its discussion of the principal variations,
it makes clear its distaste for pure proportionate several liability:
[S]everal liability shifts the burden of insolvency from
defendants to plaintiffs and creates a symmetrical
unfairness to that existing with pure joint and several
liability when a plaintiff is also comparatively responsible
for damages. Indeed, several liability is especially unfair
in universally imposing the risk of insolvency on
plaintiffs, even though some [being non-negligent] are not
comparatively responsible for their damages.
Restatement Third § 11 cmt. a at 109; see id. § C21 cmt. a, reporters’
note at 214-15 (“[E]ven with the plaintiff sharing some fault, each
defendant (as well as the plaintiff) is still a legal cause of all of
the plaintiff’s damages. Shifting the entire risk of insolvency to
the plaintiff ‘merely transform[s]the inequity of imposing that
risk entirely on solvent defendants into the equal and opposite
inequity of imposing the risk entirely on the plaintiff.”) (citation
omitted); id. § A19 cmt. e, reporters’ note at 167; id. § B18 cmt. a;
id. § B19 cmt. d (describing effects of several liability on plaintiffs
as “harsh”).
As the Restatement Third indicates, there is absolutely no
justification for treating the contributorily negligent plaintiff
worse than the defendants who tortiously injured him, and there
is worse than no justification for treating a non-negligent
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plaintiff worse than the defendants who tortiously injured him.
Yet this is the result that is reached under pure proportionate
several liability, according to which the share of the damages
that equitably should have been shouldered by insolvent or
otherwise unavailable tortfeasors is placed entirely on the
plaintiff, even if the plaintiff was not negligent, which is an
unjustified disparate treatment under the comparative
responsibility principle.
Moreover, it is not only the risk of tortfeasors’ insolvency that
is shifted entirely onto plaintiffs, even if they were not
contributorily negligent, but also the substantial burden and
costs of identifying, suing, and recovering their comparative
responsibility shares from each tortfeasor. Cf. Restatement Third
§ 10 cmt. b, reporters’ note at 105, § A18 cmt. a.
While making no formal endorsement, the Restatement Third
states that its Track C, which consists of joint and several liability
with reallocation of uncollectible shares among all the available
responsible parties, including the plaintiff if the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, is the fairest approach:
The allocation of the risk of insolvency adopted in this
“C” Track is the fairest means of handling this problem.
Reallocation may have some administrative costs and can
create incursions on finality and administrative efficiency.
Nevertheless, if handled expeditiously and with the
flexibility reflected in Comment h, the administrative
inconvenience of this reallocation system should be
manageable.
Id. § C21 cmt. a; see id. § 17 cmt. a at 148.
This joint-and-several-liability-with-reallocation approach
was the approach adopted by the Uniform Commissioners of
State Laws in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Unif. Comp.
Fault Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 39 (West Supp. 1990). Sections 5 and 6 of
the current draft of the Uniform Apportionment of Tort
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Responsibility Act provide for proportionate several liability
with reallocation, which, however, is much less desirable than
the reallocation scheme in the Restatement Third and the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, which use joint and several liability
rather than proportionate several liability as the foundation for
subsequent reallocation.
Under modified joint and several liability, the plaintiff can
initially recover the full amount of his claim (after reduction by
his percentage of comparative responsibility if he was
contributorily negligent) from any available and solvent
tortfeasor, subject to possible partial escrow pending possible
subsequent reallocation. The tortfeasor who compensated the
plaintiff then bears the expense of locating the other tortfeasors,
preparing and proving contribution claims against them, and
collecting on those claims. Conversely, under modified
proportionate several liability, the plaintiff must bear the
expense of locating each tortfeasor, preparing and proving
liability claims against each of them, collecting each tortfeasor’s
initial proportionate several liability share, and then coming back
to each (hopefully still) available and solvent tortfeasor to collect
her share of any uncollectible shares. Generally, the injured
plaintiff, rather than the available solvent defendant, can much
less afford the significant expense and delay involved in this
process. Cf. 4 Harper et al. § 22.17, at 413 (defendants are more
likely to be insured).
Moreover, the modified joint and several liability rule has the
advantage of being able to be applied across the board, in
situations involving innocent plaintiffs as well as contributorily
negligent plaintiffs, whereas the modified proportionate several
liability rule has not the slightest bit of justification in situations
involving innocent plaintiffs. No doubt for these sorts of
reasons, the modified joint and several liability rule was
incorporated, after extensive and careful deliberation, in the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act and, as the Restatement Third
notes, has been widely endorsed. See Restatement Third § C21
cmt. a, reporters’ note at 214-16.

27
The Restatement Third notes serious problems with the various
hybrid schemes that have been adopted by various states,
including the “California” scheme that is suggested by
petitioner’s amici curiae. Regarding the threshold approach,
which releases a defendant from joint and several liability if her
percentage of comparative responsibility is less than a certain
percentage, the Restatement Third states:
[A]ny threshold is an imperfect way to screen out
tangential tortfeasors, and often the threshold is set too
high (50 percent) to serve this function well. When there
are many tortfeasors, this Track does not perform well, as
it virtually guarantees that several liability will be
imposed, regardless of the role of any given tortfeasor in
the plaintiff’s injuries. This threshold series also imposes
the risk of insolvency on an entirely innocent plaintiff
whenever all solvent defendants are below the specified
threshold. To the extent that the justification for
modifying joint and several liability is the adoption of
comparative responsibility so that the plaintiff may also
be legally culpable, imposing the risk of insolvency on an
innocent plaintiff is unwarranted.
Restatement Third § 17 cmt. a at 148-49; see id. § D18 cmt. c (noting
additional problems).
Regarding the “California” approach, which employs joint
and several liability for economic damages and proportionate
several liability for noneconomic damages, the Restatement
Third states:
Some critics contend that this Track works an injustice to
those who are not wage earners and thereby suffer a
greater proportion of noneconomic damages in a lawsuit.
Others, including those that focus on deterrence, would
also dispute the proposition that noneconomic damages
are less important than economic damages. This Track
also treats unfairly the plaintiff who is not comparatively
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responsible for the injury by imposing the risk of
insolvency for noneconomic loss on the innocent plaintiff
rather than the culpable defendants. Finally, this track
creates some administrative and practical difficulties in its
operation.
Id. § 17 cmt. a at 149; see id. § E18 cmt. d & reporters’ note at 252
(noting additional problems).
CONCLUSION
The Court should reaffirm the longstanding use of joint and
several liability as part of FELA’s comparative-responsibility
regime.
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